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Abstract. In the year 2000 a competition was organised to collect face
verification results on an identical, publicly available data set using a
standard evaluation protocol. The database used was the Xm2vts database
along with the Lausanne protocol [14]. Four different institutions submit-
ted results on the database which were subsequently published in [13].
Three years later, a second contest using the same dataset and protocol
was organised as part of AVBPA 2003. This time round seven seperate
institutions submitted results to the competition. This paper presents
the results of the competition and shows that verification results on this
protocol have increased in performance by a factor of 3.
1 Introduction
In recent years the cost and size of biometric sensors and processing engines
has fallen, a growing trend towards e-commerce, teleworking and e-banking has
emerged and people’s attitude to security since September 11th has shifted. For
these reasons there has been a rapid increase in the use of biometric technology
in a range of different applications. Many of these systems are based on the
analysis of face images as they are non-intrusive and user-friendly. Moreover,
personal identity can be ascertained without the client’s assistance.
However, face recognition technology is still developing and many papers on
new face verification and recognition algorithms are being published almost daily.
However, direct comparison of the reported methods can be difficult because tests
are performed on different data with large variations in test and model database
sizes, sensors, viewing conditions, illumination and background. Typically, it is
unclear which methods are the best and for which scenarios they should be used.
Evaluation protocols can help alleviate this problem.
Typically, an evaluation protocol defines a set of data, how it should be used
by a system to perform a set of experiments and how the performance of the
system should be quantified [16]. The protocol should be designed in such a
manner that no bias in the performance is introduced, e.g. the training data is
not used for testing. It should also represent a realistic operating scenario as
different scenarios normally require different protocols, no single protocol will
be able to cover all scenarios.
Over the past few years standard datasets for testing face authentication sys-
tems have become available, e.g. Yale [24], Harvard [21], Olivetti [23], M2VTS
[22], ([1] gives a more comprehensive list). However, for many of them no asso-
ciated protocol has been defined. Experiments carried out by different organisa-
tions on these datasets will divide the data into different test and training sets
and consequentially they measure performance differently.
The FERET database has defined a protocol for face identification and face
verification [18]. However, only a development set of images from the database
are released to researchers. The remaining are sequestered by the organisers to
allow independent testing of the algorithms. To date three evaluations have taken
place, the last one in the year 2000 [17].
More recently, two Face Recognition Vendor Tests [2] have been carried out,
the first in 2000 and the second in 2002. The tests are done under supervision
and have time restrictions placed on how quickly the algorithms should compute
the results. They are aimed more at indepently testing the performance of com-
mercially available systems, however academic institutions are also able to take
part. In the more recent test 10 commercial systems were evaluated.
In the year 2000 a competition on the Xm2vts database along with the Lau-
sanne protocol [14] was carried out. Four different institutions submitted results
on the database which were subsequently published in [13]. This paper presents
the results of a second contest using the same dataset and protocol, that has been
organised as part of AVBPA 2003. This time round seven seperate institutions
submitted results to the competition.
The results published are based completely on self-assessment of the submit-
ted methods by the participating research groups. All the data from the Xm2vts
database to perform the tests is available from [3]. We believe that this open
approach will increase, in the long term, the number of algorithms that will be
tested on the XM2VTS database as each research institution is able to assess
their algorithms performance at any time. To date over 100 institutions have
obtained copies of the XM2VTS database.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section the database
and evaluation protocol are described. In section 3 an overview of each algorithm
which entered the competition is given. In section 4 the results according to the
protocol are presented along with a discussion. Finally, some conclusions are
made.
2 The XM2VTS database
The XM2VTS database [14] is a multi-modal database consisting of face images,
video sequences and speech recordings taken of 295 subjects at one month in-
tervals. This database is available at the cost of distribution from the University
of Surrey (see [3] for details). The database is primarily intended for research
and development of personal identity verification systems where it is reasonable
to assume that the client will be cooperative. Since the data acquisition was
distributed over a long period of time, significant variability of appearance of
clients, e.g. changes of hair style, facial hair, shape and presence or absence of
glasses, is present in the recordings - see figure 1.
Fig. 1. Sample images from XM2VTS database
The subjects were volunteers, mainly employees and PhD students at the
University of Surrey of both sexes and many ethnical origins. The XM2VTS
database contains 4 sessions. During each session two head rotation and ”speak-
ing” shots were taken. From the ”speaking” shot, where subjects are looking just
below the camera while reading a phonetically balanced sentence, a single image
with a closed mouth was chosen. Two shots at each session, with and without
glasses, were acquired for people regularly wearing glasses.
For the task of personal verification, a standard protocol for performance
assessment has been defined. The so called Lausanne protocol splits randomly
all subjects into a client and impostor groups. The client group contains 200
subjects, the impostor group is divided into 25 evaluation impostors and 70 test
impostors. Eight images from 4 sessions are used.
From these sets consisting of face images, training set, evaluation set and test
set are built. There exist two configurations that differ by a selection of particular
shots of people into the training, evaluation and test sets. The training set is
used to construct client models. The evaluation set is selected to produce client
and impostor access scores, which are used to find a threshold that determines
if a person is accepted or not (it can be a client-specific threshold or global
threshold). According to the Lausanne protocol the threshold is set to satisfy
certain performance levels (error rates) on the evaluation set. Finally the test
set is selected to simulate realistic authentication tests where impostor’s identity
is unknown to the system. The evaluation set is also used in fusion experiments
(classifier combination) for training, but this is not relevant in the context of
this paper.
The performance measures of a verification system are the False Acceptance
rate (FA) and the False Rejection rate (FR). False acceptance is the case where
an impostor, claiming the identity of a client, is accepted. False rejection is the
case where a client, claiming his true identity, is rejected. FA and FR are given
by:
FA = EI/I ∗ 100% FR = EC/C ∗ 100% (1)
where EC is the number of impostor acceptances, I is the number of impostor
claims, EC the number of client rejections, and C the number of client claims.
Both FA and an FR are influenced by an acceptance threshold. To simulate real
application the threshold is set on the data from the evaluation set to obtain
certain false acceptance (FAE) and false rejection error (FRE). The same thresh-
old is afterwards applied to the test data and FA and FR on the test set are
computed. Three thresholds are defined on the evaluation set:
TFAE=0 = arg minT (FRE|FAE = 0)
TFAE=FRE = (T |FAE = FRE) (2)
TFRE=0 = arg minT (FAE|FRE = 0)
Consequently, performance on the test set is characterised by six error rates:
FAFAE=0 FRFAE=0
FAFAE=FRE FRFAE=FRE
FAFRE=0 FRFRE=0
(3)
3 Overview of the Algorithms and the Scope of their
Evaluation
This section describes the face verification methods that participated in the
contest. For this competition, it was decided just to report the results at the
equal error rate, i.e. FAE = FRE.
Both configurations of the protocol are considered under two face image regis-
tration conditions: manual registration and fully automatic registration. Manual
registration is self-explanatory. Fully automatic registration requires that the
face has to be localised automatically for the test phase.
3.1 Best Results From ICPR2000 (Unis-ICPR2000)
In the ICPR 2000 competition, [13], the best verification results for both semi-
automatic and fully automatic registration techniques were performed by a
method developed at the University of Surrey. It was based on a technique
reported in [10] which performs face verification based on linear discriminant
analysis. A novel way of measuring the distance between probe image and the
client template was used. We have included the results of this technique in this
paper to give a baseline comparison and indicate how the algorithms have im-
proved over the past three years.
3.2 Dalle Molle Institute for Perceptual Artificial Intelligence
(IDIAP)
IDIAP entered two seperate face verification algorithms into the competition. A
brief description of each technique is given below.
IDIAP - Cardinaux The proposed face verification method is based on Gaus-
sian Mixture Models (GMMs), [19] and [4]. The face images are analyzed on a
block by block basis. Each block is decomposed in terms of an extension of the
2D Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), namely DCT-mod2. The GMM approach
uses a combination of Maximum Likelihood (ML) and Maximum a Posteriori
(MAP) criteria.
IDIAP - Marcel We use skin color information in addition to the gray-level
face image in order to train face verification systems using artificial neural net-
works, [12] and [11].
The representation used to code input images is based on gray-scale face
image. The face bounding box is computed using manually located eyes coordi-
nates. The face is cropped and the extracted sub-image is down-sized to a 30x40
image. After enhancement and smoothing, the face image becomes a feature vec-
tor of dimension 1200. The skin color feature is chosen to be simply the RGB
color distribution of filtered skin pixels inside the face bounding box. For each
color channel, an histogram is built using 32 discrete bins. Hence, the feature
vector produced by the concatenation of the 3 histograms (R, G and B) has 96
components.
Our face verification method is based on Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLPs).
For each client, an MLP is trained to classify an input to be either the given
client or not. The input of the MLP is a feature vector corresponding to the
face image with its skin color. The output of the MLP is either 1 (if the input
corresponds to a client) or -1 (if the input corresponds to an impostor). The
MLP is trained using both client images and impostor images, often taken to be
the images corresponding to other available clients.
3.3 Universidad Polite´cnica de Valencia (UPV)
The local feature representation approach is used in this face verification contest,
[15] [7]. Using this local feature representation scheme each image is represented
by several smaller images. To classify each test image a nearest neighbor classi-
fier is used by taking a suitable voting scheme. Given a test image, the k-nearest
neighbors of its local feature images are found among the feature vectors com-
puted for the training images. Each neighbor votes for its own class and a vector
of votes (per class) is obtained by simply counting all votes. Following a direct
voting scheme, the test image is classified into the most voted class. This sum
rule of the votes of each local feature image is similar to the sum rule used in
the Combining Classifiers theory.
3.4 Tu¨bitak Bylten (TB)
The method uses a full Gabor wavelet transform for both finding feature points
and extracting feature vectors [6]. The feature extraction algorithm of the pro-
posed method has two steps: (1) Feature point localization, (2). Feature vector
generation. Feature vectors are extracted at points with high information con-
tent on the face image. The features are not limited to eyes, nose, etc., i.e. special
facial features such as dimples are also extracted. The face image is then con-
volved with Gabor filters, and Rj is found to be the response of the face image to
the jth Gabor filter. Feature localization is done by searching local maximums
of Rj which are also having the value above the mean of all pixel values of Rj .
Feature vectors are generated at the feature points as a composition of Gabor
wavelet transform coefficients. To measure the similarity of two complex valued
feature vectors, a normalized cross-correlation function is used which ignores the
phase.
Face comparison is done in two steps. In the first step, the feature vectors
of reference images those are not close enough to the feature vectors of the test
image in means of both location and similarity, are eliminated. In the second step,
the similarity of two faces is calculated as the mean of similarities of matched
features.
3.5 Universite Catholique de Louvain (UCL)
This fuses results from three different face verification experts. It combines the 3
scores given by the algorithm using a weighted averaging. The first algorithm uses
Gradient Direction Metric in the LDA subspace to compute the score (developed
in UniS). The second algorithm uses the Probabilistic Matching to compute the
score (developed in UCL). The third method computes the score by taking the
L1 norm between the colour histogram of the face image (developed in UCL).
The images are registered using manually located eye coordinates. More details
can be found in [5].
3.6 Commercial System
The University of Kent used a well known commercial system to perform face
verification using fully automatic registration according to the Lausanne proto-
col. The package was used with the default settings. In enrollment some images
were rejected by the system. This meant that some client templates were built
with only one or two examples. The package recommends a minimum of four
suitable training images.
3.7 University of Surrey (UniS)
UniS entered three seperate face verification algorithms into the competition.
A brief description of each is given below. The third method based on the the
Shape Trace Transform was done in conjunction with a visiting researcher from
the Mahanakorn University of Technology (MUT).
Normalised Correlation in LDA Space (UniS-NC) Linear Discriminant
Analysis (LDA) projects the input image data into fisher faces which maximise
the class separability. In [9], it has been demonstrated that in the context of
face verification, a matching score based on Normalised Correlation (NC) works
effectively in the LDA space. Histogram equalisation was used to normalise the
registered face photometrically. The thresholds in the decision making system
have been determined using the Client-Specific Thresholding technique.
Error Correcting Codes (UniS-ECOC) In [8] a novel approach to face
verification based on the Error Correcting Output Coding (ECOC) classifier
was presented. In the training phase the client set is repeatedly divided into
two ECOC specified subsets to train a set of binary classifiers. The output of
the classifiers defines the ECOC feature space, in which it is easier to separate
transformed patterns representing clients and impostors. The faces were first
transformed in LDA space and the binary classifiers used to generate the binary
codes were neural networks.
Shape Trace Transform (MUT-UniS-STT) A new face representation, the
Shape Trace Transform (STT), for recognizing faces in an authentication system
[20] has been developed. The STT offers an alternative representation for faces
that has a very high discriminatory power. We estimate the dissimilarity between
two shapes by a new measure we propose, the Hausdorff context. The reinforce-
ment learning is used to search the optimal parameters of the algorithm, for
which the within-class variance of the STT is minimized. This research demon-
strates that the proposed method provides a new way for face representation.
Our system is verified with experiments on the XM2VTS database.
4 Results and Discussion
Tables 1 and 2 shows the results using manual registration for both configurations
I and II. The results on configuration I show that the best performing algorithm,
the Shape Trace Transform, achieves an error rate of 1.47%. In fact three different
methods have achieved a very similar low error rate, i.e. MUT-UniS-STT, UniS-
NC and UniS-ECOC. This is an increase in performance by a factor of 3 over the
best performing semi-automatic technique in the year 2000 competition where
the best TER obtained was 4.8%.
Tables 3 and 4 shows the results using fully automatic registration for both
configurations I and II. In the year 2000 competition the best performance for
configuration I was 13.1%, in this competition it was 3.86%. An increase in
performance of factor 3.5. Again, three different methods have achieved a similar
level of performance, i.e. UPV, IDIAP-Cardinaux and UniS-NC.
Evaluation Set Test Set
Method FA FR TER FA FR TER
UniS-ICPR2000 - - 5.00 2.30 2.50 4. 80
IDIAP-Marcel 1.67 1.67 3.34 1.748 2.000 3.75
IDIAP-Cardinaux 0.75 2.00 2.75 1.84 1.50 3.34
MUT-UniS-STT 1.16 1.05 2.21 0.97 0.50 1.47
UCL 1.17 1.17 2.34 1.71 1.50 3.21
TB 2.34 1.00 3.34 5.61 5.75 11.36
UniS-ECOC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.86 0.75 1.61
UniS-NC 0.33 1.33 1.36 0.48 1.00 1.48
Table 1. Error rates according to Lausanne protocol for configuration I with manual
registration
5 Conclusions
This paper presents a comparison of face verification algorithms that was or-
ganised in conjunction with the Audio Visual Biometric Person Authentication
Evaluation Set Test Set
Method FA FR TER FA FR TER
IDIAP-Marcel 1.25 1.25 2.5 1.465 2.250 3.715
IDIAP-Cardinaux 0.75 0.75 1.50 1.04 0.25 1.29
TB 1.10 0.50 1.60 3.22 4.50 7.72
UniS-NC 0.33 0.75 1.08 0.25 0.50 0.75
Table 2. Error rates according to Lausanne protocol for configuration II with manual
registration
Evaluation Set Test Set
Method FA FR TER FA FR TER
UniS-ICPR2000 - - 14.0 5.8 7.3 13.1
Commercial System 11.00 11.10 22.10 2.83 13.50 16.33
IDIAP-Cardinaux 1.21 2.00 3.21 1.95 2.75 4.70
UPV 1.33 1.33 2.66 1.23 2.75 3.98
UniS-NC 0.82 4.16 4.98 1.36 2.5 3.86
Table 3. Error rates according to Lausanne protocol for configuration I using full
automatic registration
Evaluation Set Test Set
Method FA FR TER FA FR TER
Commercial System 13.20 13.40 26.6 14.30 11.25 25.55
IDIAP-Cardinaux 1.25 1.20 2.45 1.35 0.75 2.10
UPV 1.75 1.75 3.50 1.55 0.75 2.30
UniS-NC 0.63 2.25 2.88 1.36 2.0 3.36
Table 4. Error rates according to Lausanne protocol for configuration II using full
automatic registration
conference of 2003. Many different verification algorithms from 7 different institu-
tions were tested using identical data from a large, publicly available multi-modal
database, the XM2VTS. Training and evaluation was carried out according to
an a priori known protocol. Results indicate that in the last three years the
performance of the algorithms have increased by a factor of three.
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